{"schema":"quox.evidence.item/1","id":"cycle:13","kind":"cycle","claim_id":null,"statement":"v1.7, Authorization Depth (verdict PASS)","not_claimed":"Not an independent third-party audit, and not a claim that no other issues exist.","status":"published","status_note":"1 published finding(s); 1 open, 0 fixed at publication.","computed_status":null,"status_history":[],"independent":{"kind":"self","note":"Issued by Quox about Quox systems (or customer sites tested under proof of control); signed by the Quox publisher key; not audited by a third party."},"issuer":"Quox","dates":{"first":"2026-10-02T01:50:09.076Z","latest":"2026-10-02T02:14:07.924Z","as_of":"2026-10-02T02:14:07.924Z"},"freshness":{"staleness_days":null,"stale":null,"expires":null,"as_of":"2026-10-23"},"evidence":[{"type":"artifact","url":"/evidence/securityAudits.json","label":"Signed security audit log (quox.security-audit-log.v1)"},{"type":"page","url":"https://quox.ai/security","label":"The /security audit band"}],"limitations":"A Quox release-gate pass over a frozen surface, with known debt listed in the record. Not an independent third-party audit.","cannot_establish":"A valid signature proves this record is authentic and unmodified; it does NOT prove the system behaved correctly. It does not establish that the findings are complete, correctly graded, or that no other issues exist.","open_findings":["finding:FND_01M3X59AD9G0KX1TBS03G0KX1T"],"withheld_findings":0,"capabilities":["security-audit","trust-bar"],"verify":{"method":"ed25519-log","artifact_url":"/evidence/securityAudits.json","receipt_url":null,"public_key":"fIQ/oPZSVq30nXqR5yU0Ny47QhHVNrD/PDqxkoIyEck=","public_key_source":"committed in the repository (scripts/security-audit-public-key.mjs) and in public/evidence/quoxtrust-verify.mjs","locator":{"file":"/evidence/securityAudits.json","path":"cycles[12]","cycle":13},"verifier_cmd":"node quoxtrust-verify.mjs ./securityAudits.json","reproduction":"Download /evidence/securityAudits.json and /evidence/quoxtrust-verify.mjs (dependency-free, Node 18+). Run the verifier command. It recomputes every WARD receipt chain_hash under the published recipe and verifies the Ed25519 signature over the canonicalized log with the committed public key. Exit 0 means authentic and unmodified; it does not mean the findings are complete or correct.","browser_verifiable":true},"citations":[{"url":"https://quox.ai/security","label":"Quox security audit log"}],"detail":{"cycle":13,"cycle_kind":"trust-bar","engagement_id":"ENG_01M3X4VXWXPVCBZF1PVVPVCBZF","scope":{"covered":"Grant/approval lifecycle (single-use/expiry/revocation), capability scope + grant binding, credential least-privilege + JIT lease, collector + auth + bastion.","excluded":["Resource/abuse bounds (T10) -> v1.8; hostile plugins -> v2.0.","A standing-grant revocation model (bastion grants are short-TTL + synchronously minted; no standing window today)."]},"method":null,"summary":"Attack the grant lifecycle. Approvals are single-use (atomic claim), expiry is revalidated at use time on both the collector and bastion layers, revocation runs through the same atomic deny gate, capability scope denies unknown agents and binds grants to tool+params+targets, and credentials are declared-type-scoped with JIT leases that expire. Clean exam; the core invariants were already conformance-pinned. Low named debt on the bastion grant layer.","controls_held":["AU1 single-use: atomic claimForResume + bastion nonce (pinned approvalGateGrantSingleUse / qlusterDelegationStore).","AU2 expiry: use-time revalidation collector + bastion (pinned toolResumeFailClosed 'T-AUTH expiry revalidation').","AU3 revocation-at-use: explicit deny through the same atomic claim gate (pinned).","AU4 scope+binding: unknown-agent denies (quox#556); bastion MatchesTool = ToolID+ParamsSHA256+targets; approval fingerprint binds action (pinned approvalGateInputBinding).","AU5 credential least-privilege + JIT lease: declared-type-scoped resolution; getActiveLease filters expires_at>now + atomic use-increment."],"totals":{"critical":0,"high":0,"medium":0,"low":1,"fixed":0,"open":1,"refuted":0},"ward":{"chain_id":"ward:org/quox/env/production","hash_recipe":"sha256(prev_chain_hash|chain_id|seq|ward_entry_id|witnessed_at|source_kind|source_id|payload_hash), hex","receipts":2},"version":"v1.7","bar_name":"Authorization Depth","verdict":"PASS","known_debt":["Bastion replay-nonce (v.seen) is in-memory, restart inside the TTL reopens a replay window (echoes v1.3 RR5; persist the set). Low.","Bastion Grant has no standalone revoke primitive, structurally mitigated (short TTL, synchronous mint). Add if a standing-grant model appears.","Vault lease enforcement is per-org opt-in (advisory/off still releases), consider default-closed.","putPending ON CONFLICT reopens a terminal row, informational, not exploitable (fresh approval.id per call)."],"passed_date":"2026-10-02","contract_version":"1.0.0"},"human_url":"/evidence/explore#cycle:13","machine_url":"/evidence/items/cycle:13.json","api_url":"/api/evidence/cycle:13","contract":{"authentic_is_not_correct":"A valid signature or a recomputed hash proves a record is authentic and unmodified. It does not prove the system behaved correctly or that a finding list is complete.","independence":"self = issued by Quox and recomputable by anyone, not audited by a third party. visitor-recomputable = the reader recomputes it offline from published material. external = an outside party issued or hosts the primary record. Quox-verified is never independently verified.","curated_status":"status OWNER-APPROVED means the owner approved the wording for publication. It is not a computed VERIFIED status. computed_status, where present, is computed from proof-engine runs and is reported separately.","verify_caveat":"authentic != correct. A valid signature proves this record is authentic and unmodified; it does NOT prove the system behaved correctly."}}