{"schema":"quox.evidence.item/1","id":"cycle:12","kind":"cycle","claim_id":null,"statement":"v1.6, Evidence Tamper-Evidence (verdict PASS)","not_claimed":"Not an independent third-party audit, and not a claim that no other issues exist.","status":"published","status_note":"1 published finding(s); 1 open, 0 fixed at publication.","computed_status":null,"status_history":[],"independent":{"kind":"self","note":"Issued by Quox about Quox systems (or customer sites tested under proof of control); signed by the Quox publisher key; not audited by a third party."},"issuer":"Quox","dates":{"first":"2026-10-02T01:36:06.478Z","latest":"2026-10-02T02:14:07.924Z","as_of":"2026-10-02T02:14:07.924Z"},"freshness":{"staleness_days":null,"stale":null,"expires":null,"as_of":"2026-10-23"},"evidence":[{"type":"artifact","url":"/evidence/securityAudits.json","label":"Signed security audit log (quox.security-audit-log.v1)"},{"type":"page","url":"https://quox.ai/security","label":"The /security audit band"}],"limitations":"A Quox release-gate pass over a frozen surface, with known debt listed in the record. Not an independent third-party audit.","cannot_establish":"A valid signature proves this record is authentic and unmodified; it does NOT prove the system behaved correctly. It does not establish that the findings are complete, correctly graded, or that no other issues exist.","open_findings":["finding:FND_01M3X4JCBHM63HPTH6F9M63HPT"],"withheld_findings":0,"capabilities":["security-audit","trust-bar"],"verify":{"method":"ed25519-log","artifact_url":"/evidence/securityAudits.json","receipt_url":null,"public_key":"fIQ/oPZSVq30nXqR5yU0Ny47QhHVNrD/PDqxkoIyEck=","public_key_source":"committed in the repository (scripts/security-audit-public-key.mjs) and in public/evidence/quoxtrust-verify.mjs","locator":{"file":"/evidence/securityAudits.json","path":"cycles[11]","cycle":12},"verifier_cmd":"node quoxtrust-verify.mjs ./securityAudits.json","reproduction":"Download /evidence/securityAudits.json and /evidence/quoxtrust-verify.mjs (dependency-free, Node 18+). Run the verifier command. It recomputes every WARD receipt chain_hash under the published recipe and verifies the Ed25519 signature over the canonicalized log with the committed public key. Exit 0 means authentic and unmodified; it does not mean the findings are complete or correct.","browser_verifiable":true},"citations":[{"url":"https://quox.ai/security","label":"Quox security audit log"}],"detail":{"cycle":12,"cycle_kind":"trust-bar","engagement_id":"ENG_01M3X425XKMGQPRS5PCYMGQPRS","scope":{"covered":"WARD evidence chain integrity + ordering + action-binding + independent recompute, across the running collector/ward artifact and the /security export.","excluded":["Authorization depth (T-AUTH) -> v1.7; resource bounds (T10) -> v1.8; hostile plugins -> v2.0.","Throughput of verify at scale (bounded-verify wedge already fixed; this bar is detection-correctness)."]},"method":null,"summary":"The most on-thesis bar: attack the evidence itself. The WARD chain binds seq + prev_chain_hash + payloadHash; verify detects forgery (CHAIN_HASH_MISMATCH), omission (SEQ_INVALID), reorder/linkage (CHAIN_LINK_BROKEN) and tip tamper (TIP_MISMATCH) with no catch-swallow; no mutation path exists on ward_entries. The witness commitment binds the effective action via payload_commit/canonical_action (the historical payload-exclusion bug is fixed). An independent recompute refuses to publish on mismatch. Clean exam; added the missing gap-detection pin.","controls_held":["ET1 chain completeness/gap-detection: verifyChain returns SEQ_INVALID on a deleted/omitted entry (live throwaway-DB test + new red-proven pin); no DELETE/UPDATE on ward_entries.","ET2 no silent reorder: ordering hash-bound (seq + prev_chain_hash), not timestamp-trust.","ET3 action-binding: witness hash binds payload_commit -> canonical_action (tool/tenant/identity/content_commit/outcome); payload-exclusion bug fixed (hooks.js).","ET4 recompute fails closed: export-security-audit.mjs re-derives + throws on mismatch (exit 1; fail-closed if key unprovisioned); ward-verify EXIT_BROKEN=1."],"totals":{"critical":0,"high":0,"medium":0,"low":1,"fixed":0,"open":1,"refuted":0},"ward":{"chain_id":"ward:org/quox/env/production","hash_recipe":"sha256(prev_chain_hash|chain_id|seq|ward_entry_id|witnessed_at|source_kind|source_id|payload_hash), hex","receipts":2},"version":"v1.6","bar_name":"Evidence Tamper-Evidence","verdict":"PASS","known_debt":["ET3(b) (low, FND_01M3X4JCBHM63HPTH6F9M63HPT): ward_entries.org_id + tags are bare columns outside chainHash; a DB rewrite mis-attributes tenant-scoped visibility without breaking chain verify (authoritative org is hash-bound in payload_commit). Supervised fix: verifyChain cross-checks the columns against the hash-committed values, do NOT change the chainHash recipe (breaks all historical chains)."],"passed_date":"2026-10-02","contract_version":"1.0.0"},"human_url":"/evidence/explore#cycle:12","machine_url":"/evidence/items/cycle:12.json","api_url":"/api/evidence/cycle:12","contract":{"authentic_is_not_correct":"A valid signature or a recomputed hash proves a record is authentic and unmodified. It does not prove the system behaved correctly or that a finding list is complete.","independence":"self = issued by Quox and recomputable by anyone, not audited by a third party. visitor-recomputable = the reader recomputes it offline from published material. external = an outside party issued or hosts the primary record. Quox-verified is never independently verified.","curated_status":"status OWNER-APPROVED means the owner approved the wording for publication. It is not a computed VERIFIED status. computed_status, where present, is computed from proof-engine runs and is reported separately.","verify_caveat":"authentic != correct. A valid signature proves this record is authentic and unmodified; it does NOT prove the system behaved correctly."}}